THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE RED ARMY AND THE WEHRMACHT IN THE KYIV DIRECTION IN 1941 AS REFLECTED IN THE UKRAINIAN NEWSPAPER “SVOBODA” IN THE USA

Abstract

The article highlights materials related to the confrontation between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in the Kyiv direction in 1941, which were published in July-October 1941 on the pages of the Ukrainian newspaper “Svoboda” in the USA. It is concluded that the newspaper included diverse publications on this topic: brief information about the hostilities based on the presentation of front line reports of both parties in the war; presentation of analytical articles by military experts with an assessment of the strategy and tactics of the opponents; reviews of the battles near Kyiv from other countries; particular cartographic documents, photos, etc. Certain assessments and analytical judgments cited in the “Svoboda” publications at the time, in particular highlighting the fact that the Red Army Command and Stalin himself were responsible for the inability to resist the German offensive, find endorsement in the works of modern researchers describing the defeats of the Red Army in 1941, including near Kyiv. The general tone of the materials used by “Svoboda” demonstrates its position that is both anti-Soviet and critical towards Nazi Germany. Soviet and German reports were presented on the whole proportionally. The newspaper tried to present the reports on the course of military operations in the Kyiv direction by both opposing sides, and in this regard acts mainly as a secondary source for researchers. The newspaper’s analytical publications on the subject set out some of the opinions of American military experts about the encirclement of the Soviet armies near Kyiv as a major strategic manoeuvre, and the assessment of talented German military leaders, in particular Guderian, as one of the most capable commanders in the German tank strategy. The rate and surprise of the offensive, the concentration of forces, the close interaction of the branches of the military, the encirclement of the main enemy forces by tank forces have repeatedly brought success to the German side since the beginning of World War II. These same factors, along with the grave mistakes by the top Soviet leadership and military command, also determined the outcome of the confrontation between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in the Kyiv direction in 1941.