INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA INFLUENCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN CRIMEA (1991–2014)

Abstract

The article examines the experience of the Russian Federation’s information and propaganda influence in Crimea from the moment of Ukraine’s declaration of independence until the end of the special operation of Russian troops (forces) to seize Crimea, commonly called the “Crimean Spring”. The reasons for the first unsuccessful attempt to seize Crimea by the Russian Federation, the period of the so-called “Crimean crisis” (1992–1994) are considered. Possible reasons for the failure (suspension) of actions to capture the Crimean Peninsula at that time and further events and crises in and around Crimea, which were inspired by the Russian Federation in order to rock the situation on the peninsula until its annexation in 2014. Based on the results of the analysis of these events, the author identified the main reasons for the success of the Russian special services’ information and propaganda activities directly during the so-called “Crimean Spring” (2014). The study pays special attention to the analysis of the preparation and conduct of special interagency operations of Russian troops (forces) and special services to seize Crimea, one of the elements of which was the integrated use of a number of information and propaganda measures aimed at various segments of the population and levels of management of law enforcement agencies and local governments. The author clarifies the role and place of paramilitary formations during the events of the so-called “Crimean Spring”. The study examines the main measures taken by the Ukrainian authorities to counteract the Russian Federation’s attempts to seize the Crimean Peninsula during the Crimean crisis (1992–1994) and the Crimean Spring (2014). As a result, the author draws conclusions that reveal more deeply the reasons for the effectiveness of the actions of the special services of the Russian Federation in the information and psychological sphere.