THE AFGHAN CRISIS (1980–1991) IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UN: RESEARCH SOURCE BASE

Abstract

Based on the study of numerous sources, including UN documents; transcripts, minutes, and decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU; transcripts of meetings and negotiations between Soviet leaders and Afghan politicians; speeches, speeches, interviews of Soviet and Afghan state and military leaders; memoirs of participants and contemporaries of events, the role of the UN in resolving the Afghan crisis during 1980–1991 is being explored. The author analyzes a wide range of UN documents, the majority of which belong to the collection of the main library of the UN system – the Dag Hammarskjöld Library. These include the UN Security Council meeting records, UN Security Council resolutions, transcripts of the UN General Assembly meetings, UN General Assembly resolutions, reports and briefings by the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and attempts to resolve the conflict. This group of sources demonstrates the world community's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the activities of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly in addressing the issue, and the stages of the Geneva negotiation process (1982–1988). The protocols of meetings and decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU are being studied, which illuminate the process of making the decision to begin armed intervention in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the principles of propaganda accompanying the invasion, and the evolution of Soviet leadership's views on the policy of the USSR in Afghanistan. The transcripts of meetings and negotiations between Soviet leaders and Afghan politicians are being examined, which contain clear instructions and guidelines for the behavior of Afghan diplomats at meetings of the UN Security Council and General Assembly, during the Afghan-Pakistani negotiating process. This group of sources has demonstrated the complete absence of independent foreign policy in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s. The analysis focuses on speeches, interviews, and statements made by Soviet and Afghan state and military officials, primarily those that provided justification for the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan. These justifications included the need to protect the gains of the April Revolution, repel external threats, and numerous requests from Afghan leadership, as well as the assertion that the Kremlin's policy toward Afghanistan was in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Additionally, the sources also contain numerous accusations against the United States for its unwillingness to resolve the situation surrounding Afghanistan. The research also examines the memoirs of participants and contemporaries of the events, including the recollections of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General D. Cordovez and E. Shevardnadze, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. This group of sources significantly expanded the research base and provided a better understanding of the spirit of the era.