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INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA INFLUENCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN CRIMEA (1991–2014)

The article examines the experience of the Russian Federation's information and propaganda influence in Crimea from the moment of Ukraine's declaration of independence until the end of the special operation of Russian troops (forces) to seize Crimea, commonly called the "Crimean Spring". The reasons for the first unsuccessful attempt to seize Crimea by the Russian Federation, the period of the so-called "Crimean crisis" (1992–1994) are considered. Possible reasons for the failure (suspension) of actions to capture the Crimean Peninsula at that time and further events and crises in and around Crimea, which were inspired by the Russian Federation in order to rock the situation on the peninsula until its annexation in 2014.

Based on the results of the analysis of these events, the author identified the main reasons for the success of the Russian special services' information and propaganda activities directly during the so-called "Crimean Spring" (2014). The study pays special attention to the analysis of the preparation and conduct of special interagency operations of Russian troops (forces) and special services to seize Crimea, one of the elements of which was the integrated use of a number of information and propaganda measures aimed at various segments of the population and levels of management of law enforcement agencies and local governments. The author clarifies the role and place of paramilitary formations during the events of the so-called "Crimean Spring".

The study examines the main measures taken by the Ukrainian authorities to counteract the Russian Federation's attempts to seize the Crimean Peninsula during the Crimean crisis (1992–1994) and the Crimean Spring (2014).

As a result, the author draws conclusions that reveal more deeply the reasons for the effectiveness of the actions of the special services of the Russian Federation in the information and psychological sphere.

Key words: *information and propaganda influence, paramilitary formations, special operation, Crimea, Crimean Spring, Crimean crisis, operation of troops (forces), deployment of troops (forces), deception, disinformation.*

The information and propaganda measures carried out by the Russian Federation (RF) in the territory of the Crimean Peninsula before the start of the occupation, as well as the experience of their preparation and execution, deserve in-depth study and consideration in the daily activities of the relevant agencies in order to determine how Ukraine can effectively counter such measures. In this context, it is reasonable to examine the information and propaganda activities of the RF in Crimea from the moment Ukraine declared its independence to the occupation of the peninsula.

Some domestic scholars have paid attention to the topic of the Russian Federation's information and propaganda influence in Crimea in their studies. T. Andrievsky, O. Levchenko, S. Polumienko define the goals of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war and consider the stages of implementation of its objectives, but their views are quite broad, strategic, and little attention is paid to the narrow issue of the seizure of the ARC. The greatest attention to this issue was paid by H. Pocheptsov, O. Turansky, Y. Tverdokhlib, E. Magda, and O. Hulyma, although they focused on the events before and during the occupation of the peninsula. Among foreign authors on this topic, it is worth noting the research of S. Plokhii, T. Kuzio and others, who partially touched upon this issue in their works. However, the issue of information and propaganda influences is not considered comprehensively, as a rule,

researchers focus on the events of the so-called “Crimean Spring” and the occupation of the peninsula (2014).

Purpose of the article. Based on an analysis of the preparatory stage of the special operation by Russian troops (forces) to seize Crimea, the aim is to identify the main phases of the Russian Federation’s information and propaganda influences in Crimea from the time Ukraine declared independence up to the moment Russia occupied the peninsula and to determine the specifics of their organization, conduct, and outcomes.

From the moment the Crimean Oblast was transferred from the RSFSR (1954) to the Ukrainian SSR, until Ukraine left the Soviet Union, one can assert that there was in fact no “Crimean issue”.

Despite the signing of a 1990 treaty recognizing each other’s territorial integrity within the borders that existed at the time of the USSR, the day after the Declaration of Ukraine’s Act of Independence, the spokesperson for Russian President B. Yeltsin, P. Voshanov, stated: “...Russia reserves the right to raise the issue of revising borders... what has been said applies to all neighboring republics except the three Baltic states...” In another statement, he explicitly mentioned Crimea as one of the Russia’s potential claims. After the all-Ukrainian referendum in December 1991, P. Voshanov repeated this thesis (Plokhly S., 2023, p. 73).

In December 1991, Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement on creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which again stated: “To recognize and respect each other’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth”. Yet, in less than half a year, in May 1992, the Verkhovnyi Soviet of Russia declared that the acts transferring the Crimean Oblast to Ukraine in 1954 had no legal force.

According to some researchers (Петровский В. В., 2002), this was a fully deliberate policy. Various Russian agencies and officials regularly floated baseless statements that lacked the status of an official state position but were actively exploited as if they were official, especially by pro-Russian forces in Crimea.

With the active support of Russia’s ruling circles and various instruments of influence on the top political leadership of Ukraine on the peninsula, the Supreme Council of Crimea adopted an act proclaiming state sovereignty and its own Constitution (1992). At the same time, Crimea restored its status as an autonomous republic.

The reaction of Ukraine’s ruling circles to these events was rather sluggish (they feared an escalation). Seeing this, the Russian parliament formalized slogans about the illegal transfer of Crimea to Ukraine as a resolution and proposed settling the issue through negotiations and a popular referendum¹.

In the authors’ opinion, as early as 1992, the Russian parliament was fully aware that it was effectively provoking a war with Ukraine, and all its statements and resolutions aimed to take Crimea from Ukraine. These events marked the beginning of the so-called “Crimean Crisis” (1992–1994)².

The entire reaction of the Ukrainian authorities to Crimean separatism amounted to a statement calling for a cessation of illegal actions. Later, there was an appeal to the UN Security Council with a complaint against the Kremlin’s actions, and Ukraine received full support for the indivisibility of its borders. At that time, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk feared an escalation of the conflict with Russia. Thus, the Ukrainian authorities made no real attempts to suppress separatism in Crimea, creating fertile ground for a deeper crisis on the peninsula.

Facing no resistance from the Ukrainian authorities, Russia actively continued to create and finance various pro-Russian movements, political parties, and public organizations in Crimea. Among these, the Republican Movement of Crimea (RMK) stood out significantly as one of the most active and populous groups.

¹ Постановление ВС РФ «О правовой оценке решений высших органов гос. власти РСФСР по изменению статуса Крыма, принятых в 1954 году» от 21 мая 1992 года № 2809-1. (1992). *Ведомости Съезда народных депутатов Российской Федерации и Верховного Совета Российской Федерации*. 04.06.1992 № 22. С. 1178.

² Кримська криза 1994 р. [Електронний ресурс]. URL: <https://www.zsu.gov.ua/oos/istoriya-vijny/peredumovy/krymska-kryza-1994r/> (22.06.2024).

Later, the RMK merged with the “People’s Party of Crimea” into a single bloc, tellingly named “Russia”, led by Y. Meshkov, who was soon elected President of Crimea (1994). After his victory, Russian radical elements began operating on the peninsula with the support of Russian security forces. Ukrainian security structures were effectively unable to counter the threat or simply followed direct orders from Moscow and were gradually taken over by representatives of the “new” Crimean authorities.

It was at this moment that power changed in Kyiv (1994). L. Kuchma became the new President, determined to resolve the Crimean issue in Ukraine’s favor. To stabilize the situation, units of the National Guard of Ukraine and the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, totaling 60.000 personnel, were deployed to the peninsula, effectively removing local law enforcement from duty.

According to L. Kuchma’s recollections, his agreement with B. Yeltsin regarding Crimea was reached quite simply: “...When a difficult situation arose in Crimea, with President Meshkov and his government – incidentally, mostly outsiders – they started talking about almost separating the peninsula from Ukraine. I called Boris Nikolayevich, and he completely understood the situation and responded appropriately...”

In the author’s view, there are several possible reasons why B. Yeltsin refused at that time to escalate the situation further. Perhaps gaining control over the Black Sea Fleet (and thus retaining influence over Crimea) was his priority, or he might have lacked the economic capacity to start a war while already fighting in Chechnya. It is also possible he did not abandon the Crimean issue but merely postponed it.

To weaken the separatist movement, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine legally renamed Crimea the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC). Six months later, it abolished the 1992 Constitution of Crimea and the position of President of Crimea³.

In this context, we can cite the recollections of the then-head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), Yevhen Marchuk, a participant in these events. After phone negotiations between L. Kuchma and B. Yeltsin, Crimean officials with Russian citizenship began leaving Crimea for Russia. The President, together with security officials, began preparing an operation to restore constitutional order in Crimea. During its preparation, “Alpha” groups dressed in civilian clothes arrived in Crimea by car and settled in Sevastopol’s sanatoriums. Their task was to detain the most dangerous pro-Russian elements, including militants brought in by Russian special services to destabilize the situation. Meanwhile, Federal Security Service (FSS) and Main Intelligence Directorate (MID) officers actively resisted Ukrainian security forces, conducting surveillance and intimidating people (Расвський Д., Коберник К., 2023).

The task of capturing the Supreme Council of Crimea in Simferopol was assigned to a helicopter-borne assault of 70 personnel, which took place quickly and almost bloodlessly at dawn on March 17, 1995. President of Crimea Y. Meshkov was blocked inside the Supreme Council building and later left his office voluntarily, officially citing poor health (Марчук Є. К., 1998, с. 321).

Thus, ended Russia’s first attempt to seize Crimea by military and political means.

Already in 1998, pro-Russian political forces in Crimea were defeated in the elections to the Crimean Supreme Council. That same year, the new parliament adopted a constitution that brought Crimea’s basic law into line with Ukraine’s Constitution. A year earlier, the issue of the fleet had been resolved, and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine was signed⁴.

At the same time, the Russian Federation did not abandon its plans for Crimea. Exploiting gaps in Ukrainian legislation and its privileged position in Crimea – especially in Sevastopol – it began what

³ Постанова Верховної Ради України про виконання постанов Верховної Ради України «Про зупинення дії Закону Республіки Крим “Про відновлення конституційних основ державності Республіки Крим”, “Про політико-правову ситуацію в Автономній Республіці Крим” та “Про виконання Постанови Верховної Ради України “Про політико-правову ситуацію в Автономній Республіці Крим”» 91/95-ВР. (1995). *Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР)*, 1995, № 11, ст. 75.

⁴ Договір про дружбу, співробітництво і партнерство між Україною і Російською Федерацією. Закон № 13/98-ВР від 14. 01. 98. (1998). URL:<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643006#top> (30.06.2024).

is referred to as a “creeping expansion”. For example, with the support of then-Mayor of Moscow Y. Luzhkov, housing for retired Russian military personnel was actively built in Sevastopol (800 apartments), along with two Russian schools and a kindergarten; branches of Russian universities also appeared⁵.

The situation in the information space was catastrophic. By 2000 in Crimea – excluding Russian press deliberately brought onto the peninsula to push purely Russian narratives – there were 412 registered Russian-language print media (mainly serving the same propaganda function) and only four Ukrainian-language print media. (Яблонська Н. В., 2006, с. 247). The situation on television was no better.

For local residents, especially in Sevastopol, there was no problem obtaining a Russian passport without relinquishing their Ukrainian citizenship (though Ukrainian law forbids this). Moreover, it was issued through a simplified procedure.

When V. Putin came to power, the Kremlin’s official rhetoric remained unchanged, unlike its practical actions. Starting in 2000, Russia continued a series of special information and propaganda operations against Ukraine aimed at destabilizing the situation both within and outside the country. Among the first such provocations were the so-called “gas wars” and the conflict over Tuzla Island.

The events of the 2004 Orange Revolution, combined with the defeat of V. Yanukovych in the presidential election, forced the Russian political leadership to abandon plans for a purely political takeover of the peninsula and switch to a force-based scenario for seizing Crimea. As recalled by one of the active participants in the occupation of Crimea, the “people’s mayor” of Sevastopol O. Chaly, “in 2004–2005, we were preparing for a coup for the first time in connection with the Orange Revolution”⁶.

At the same time, the Russian leadership did not yet dare to implement a purely force-based scenario and instead decided to rely on strengthening information and propaganda influences – the so-called “soft power” strategy. With support from the special services, Russia’s ruling elites maximally fueled pro-Russian sentiment among the local population throughout the ARC and the city of Sevastopol.

One of the ways to achieve this goal was for Russian special services to create in Crimea an extensive anti-Ukrainian network based on earlier cells. Its activities were fully controlled by Moscow. Among the main organizations implementing Kremlin ideas on the peninsula were the Crimean structures of the Party of Regions (PR), the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, the parties “Rodina” and “Russkoye Edinstvo”, various Orthodox groups oriented toward “Russian World” ideas, and criminalized paramilitary formations (security structures, fight clubs, primarily the group “Oplot”)⁷.

Myths about eternal unity with the Russian people – “the triune, artificially divided Russian people” – were imposed on Crimeans, along with narratives about the benefits of joining either a modern Russian empire or a [USSR-2]. Simultaneously, Ukraine’s elites were portrayed as incapable of developing the peninsula. It was repeatedly stressed that Ukraine’s Armed Forces and other military formations – unlike Russia’s – were merely vestigial symbols of statehood and would not actually be deployed to defend Crimea.

In Crimea, as in other places where it artificially created flashpoints, Russia relied on local criminal elements, which very often, particularly during V. Yanukovych’s presidency (2010–2014), acted in concert with local law enforcement. Gradually, these criminal groups merged with Crimean branches of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine, which became conduits and primary levers of Russian influence, later playing a pivotal role in the so-called “Crimean Spring”.

⁵ Киреев А., 2019. От школ до квартир: в Севастополе вспоминают дела Лужкова. URL: <https://crimea.ria.ru/amp/20191210/Ot-shkol-do-kvartir-v-Sevastopole-vspominayut-dobrye-dela-Luzhkova-1117735472.html> (24.05.2024).

⁶ Історія повзучої анексії Криму 2004–2010 року. URL: <https://cpd.gov.ua/main/istoriya-povzuchoyi-aneksiyi-krymu-2004-2010-roky/> (29.06.2024).

⁷ Там само.

Moscow also actively exploited and intensified ethnic hostility between ethnic Russians and Crimean Tatars, fueling xenophobic sentiments.

During this period, the Kremlin's rhetoric was quite contradictory. In April 2008, during a conversation with U.S. President George W. Bush at the NATO summit in Bucharest, Putin stated: "Ukraine is not even a state. Part of its territory is Eastern Europe, and part – a significant one – was given to it by us... If Ukraine goes to NATO, it will go without Crimea and the East – it will simply collapse"⁸. Yet in August 2008, when asked by a German ARD TV journalist whether Crimea might be the next conflict after Georgia, Putin insisted that Crimea in no way constituted a disputed territory and that Russia had long recognized Ukraine's present borders.

According to many experts, by no later than 2008, Russia's military-political leadership was carrying out comprehensive military and propaganda preparations for the occupation of Crimea and, more broadly, armed aggression against Ukraine. Russian military intelligence units, under the guise of "historical reenactments", conducted reconnaissance of the future theater of operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Following the analysis of shortcomings revealed during the military conflict in South Ossetia, from August 2008 onward, Russia launched a large-scale military reform that fundamentally changed its approach to the development and employment of its armed forces⁹.

With the outbreak of the Euromaidan events ("Revolution of Dignity"), ideas that Russian propaganda had planted for years via news, films (TV series), and even the internet began producing the desired effect in Ukraine's southeastern regions. This was particularly evident in Crimea, where Russia's efforts were based on old, well-known ideas and Soviet-era constructs – constructs still maintained by Russia's press and television to sustain the «virtual» dependence of former Soviet citizens on the "successor state".

This situation, in the run-up to the occupation of Crimea, combined with other significant factors, strongly affected the mindset of Ukrainian security personnel, who were unwilling to fire on Russians in Crimea, perceiving them as «their own». Phrases like "One people, one country. We're brothers what do we have to fight over? The fascists and Banderites are to blame" were ubiquitous.

Paramilitary formations played a major role in preparing and carrying out the operation to seize Crimea. From the very start of the armed aggression against Ukraine in spring 2014, Russian and pro-Russian paramilitary units actively participated in occupying Crimea, and later in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. These formations allowed Russia to maintain an appearance of non-intervention in the process while simultaneously giving the impression of mass and spontaneous local uprisings. Thus, the hybrid influence effect (HIE) emerged: on the one hand, an instrument of pressure on Ukraine, and on the other, a means by which the Russian Federation could mask its direct military intervention (Белесков М. М., 2021, с. 25).

As part of its preparation for hybrid warfare against Ukraine, Russia consistently created conditions conducive to its success. On the one hand, it undertook measures to prevent an adequate response by Ukraine's military-political leadership, government bodies, and security/defense sector to negative changes during the crisis period. Exploiting contradictions and gaps in Ukrainian legislation, Russia enabled various paramilitary formations to exist on Ukrainian territory alongside regular Russian military units – provided they did not formally violate the law. In reality, though, their activities posed a threat to national security. Thus, Ukraine's imperfect legislation did not allow law enforcement and other government agencies (tasked with safeguarding public and national security) to respond effectively to such threats.

Another critically important aspect was Moscow's decision on the composition and preparation of forces for hybrid operations. The main tasks were assigned to regular Russian military units, notably its special operations forces ("little green men"), who would be presented on Crimean territory as local

⁸ Виступлення Володимира Путіна на самміті НАТО (Бухарест, 4 квітня 2008 року). URL: <https://www.unian.net/politics/110868-vystuplenie-vladimira-putina-na-sammite-nato-buharest-4-aprelya-2008-goda.html> (28.06.2024).

⁹ Історія повзучої анексії Криму...

self-defense forces. By doing so, they were to frame the planned occupation as the result of internal Ukrainian political strife. Pro-Russian paramilitary formations were to support their actions and further destabilize (escalate) the situation in Crimea. The FSS and the MID of the Russian General Staff were primarily responsible for their command, financing, training, operational support, and coordination.

It should be noted that in September 2013, the Russian armed units together with the Black Sea Fleet slated to seize Crimea underwent training during joint Russian-Belarusian exercises in Russia's Kaliningrad region. These drills rehearsed the defense of compatriots allegedly persecuted on the territory of a foreign state. This purported "defense of Russian-speaking compatriots" in eastern Ukraine would later become a principal pretext for Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine – a justification it could also apply to other neighboring countries.

In October 2013, work began on forming so-called "Crimean self-defense" units from local residents and members of Cossack organizations from Kuban, the Don, and Crimea. These units were trained for joint action with Russian troops. A key outcome of this training was the synchronization of different contingents when carrying out common tasks, as well as a readiness to do so without moral or psychological constraints.

During the seizure of Crimea, the core of these paramilitary formations consisted of the so-called "Crimean self-defense" forces, Cossacks, and former members of the "Berkut" special police unit, whose actions were strongly supported by pro-Russian public and religious groups, as well as collaborators from among local officials, educators, medical workers, cultural figures, and others¹⁰. Meanwhile, separate detachments of Russian private military companies (PMCs), including "Wagner", were also present in Crimea at that time, but they limited themselves to observing the situation on the peninsula (Коваль М. В., 2023, с. 20–21).

All of these paramilitary components operated under a single plan and overall leadership of Russian special services and military personnel throughout the entire operation to occupy Crimea.

A successful information and propaganda campaign resulted in the occupation of Crimea – an operation carried out practically without a single shot. Armed "polite men" did whatever was needed, with almost no one attempting to interfere.

One indication that the main focus in Crimea was on information and propaganda was the involvement of a large number of PR specialists and political technologists, who became direct or indirect participants in the project to integrate Ukraine into Russia, which began in November – December 2013 (as evidenced by the secret awarding of medals to 300 journalists for their role in the Crimean campaign).

During the implementation of the information component of the operation known as the "Crimean Spring", Moscow actively used a tactic of selecting from various alternative sources the descriptions of events that best served its intended military objectives.

According to research by H. Pocheptsov, the Russian special services employed the following techniques:

- **The increase of the militarization signs:** "little green men", "polite men";
- **Eliminating indications of illegality:** "people's mayor", "people's governor", "people's self-defense", "reunification of Crimea";
- **Emphasizing negative characteristics of the opponent:** "militants", "punishers", "punitive operation", "Kyiv junta", "self-proclaimed Kyiv authorities", "self-proclaimed prime minister";
- **Overstating their own positive image up to sacralization:** "Crimea is ours!", "Sevastopol, the city of Russian sailors";
- **Describing actions in order to legitimize them:** occupying administrative buildings was accompanied by commentary such as "This is ours, the people's, and we are the people".

¹⁰ Як війська РФ за два тижні захопили Крим. (2024). *Крим. Реалії*. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d8MCbYPFf4 (16.03.2024).

Hence, information flows concerning Crimea were censored: only positive reporting was generated, while negative information was blocked.

Constant use was made of symbolic labels – “fascists”, “neo-Nazis”, “Banderites” – words that carried strong negative perception for an audience conditioned by Russian (Soviet) propaganda. In this way, the Kremlin pursued two objectives simultaneously: dividing Ukrainians into “good” and “bad”, while stressing that Russia was the sole savior of the “good” Ukrainians/Russians from the “bad” ones (Почепцов Г., 2016, с. 452).

The peculiarities of the information and propaganda impact of the Crimean Spring events include the following:

- **Prioritizing the information and propaganda component over physical influence.** For example, the “little green men” were portrayed as brethren Slavs who posed no threat and simply came to help;

- **Deploying military force only at the final stage of events.**

- **Actively using (cultivating) old Soviet ideas and slogans** (slightly adapted to current realities) and not introducing new narratives.

- **A particularly significant role for journalists and political strategists.**

For Russia to carry out this information and propaganda influence successfully, it was necessary to ensure maximum unpredictability in how events would unfold, prompting Ukrainians to keep searching for information and thus remain glued to their televisions and computers.

The information flow was overwhelming, with frequent contradictions in different reports. Thus, the physical takeover of Crimea was accomplished mainly through a deliberately manufactured atmosphere of uncertainty and ambiguity, aimed at blocking any possible resistance by both the local populace and the Ukrainian government.

After conducting the research, we came to the following conclusions:

1. From the moment Ukraine declared independence, the top political leadership of the Russian Federation began implementing a set of information and propaganda measures aimed primarily at fully or partially reintegrating Ukrainian territory into Russia. This activity was especially intense in Crimea.

2. The level of Ukrainian resistance to such actions varied significantly over time, depending on the political will of the country’s leadership. Overall, this approach by the Ukrainian authorities did not achieve the desired outcome, unlike the actions of Russian special services which, having taken control of and then occupied Crimea, fully accomplished their assigned task.

3. Neglect by the Ukrainian authorities – especially during V. Yanukovich’s presidency – of the need to counter Kremlin-driven information and propaganda threats; gaps in Ukrainian legislation; and the passivity and indecisiveness of the state leadership and Ukrainian security structures (particularly in Crimea), combined with other factors, became the main reasons for Russia’s success in preparing and carrying out the operation known as the “Crimean Spring”.

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changed everything]. Available from: <https://babel.ua/texts/95715-u-1994-roci-rosiya-vzhe-namagalasya-zahopiti-krim-cherez-separatista-yuriya-myeshkova-use-zminila-odna-specoperaciya-sbu-na-pivostrov-i-perekazuyemo-dokumentalku-suspilnogo-pro-ci-podiji> [Accessed 06.25.2024]. (in Ukrainian).

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Григорій Чмихало

ІНФОРМАЦІЙНО-ПРОПАГАНДИСТСЬКІ ВПЛИВИ РФ У КРИМУ (1991–2014)

У статті досліджується досвід інформаційно-пропагандистського впливу Російської Федерації в Криму з моменту проголошення незалежності України до завершення спецоперації російських військ (сил) із захоплення Криму, що отримала загальну назву «Кримська весна». Розглянуто причини першої невдалої спроби захоплення Криму Російською Федерацією, період так званої «Кримської кризи» (1992–1994 рр.). Проаналізовано можливі причини невдачі (призупинення) дій із захоплення Кримського півострова в той час та подальші події і кризи в Криму та навколо нього, які інспірувалися Російською Федерацією з метою розхитування ситуації на півострові аж до його анексії у 2014 році.

За результатами аналізу цих подій було визначено основні причини успіху інформаційно-пропагандистської діяльності російських спецслужб безпосередньо під час так званої «Кримської весни» (2014 р.). Окрему увагу в дослідженні приділено аналізу підготовки та проведення спеціальної міжвідомчої операції російських військ (сил) і спецслужб із захоплення Криму, одним з елементів якої стало комплексне застосування низки інформаційно-пропагандистських заходів, спрямованих на різні верстви населення та рівні керівництва правоохоронних органів і органів місцевого самоврядування.

У дослідженні проаналізовано основні заходи, вжиті українською владою для протидії спробам Російської Федерації захопити Кримський півострів під час «Кримської кризи» (1992–1994 рр.) та «Кримської весни» (2014 р.).

У результаті зроблено висновки, які глибше розкривають причини ефективності дій спецслужб Російської Федерації в інформаційно-психологічній сфері.

Ключові слова: інформаційно-пропагандистський вплив, парамілітарні формування, спеціальна операція, Кримська весна, Кримська криза, операція військ (сил), застосування військ (сил), введення в оману, дезінформація.

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